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ABSTRACT
Managing transboundary river basins is never easy and usually involves conicts.
This paper introduces a special class of games with externalities and issue linkage
to promote cooperation on transboundary water resources. The paper analyzes
whether issue linkages can be used as a form of negotiations on sharing bene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and mitigating conicts. It is shown that whenever opportunities for linkages exist,
countries may indeed contribute towards cooperation. In particular, if the linked
games are convex, the grand coalition is the only optimal level of social welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Transboundary basins account for 60 percent of global river ows. About 40
percent of the worlds population lives in transboundary river basins and 145
countries share river basins (Fox, 2009). Of the worlds 263 transboundary
basins, 176 are bilateral and 85 are shared by more than 2 riparian states
(Wolf et al. 1999). Transboundary water resources are often a cause for
conict among riparian entities and negotiations over water among sovereign
nations are typically di¢ cult. As nature has not distributed water resources
equitably, there is too much water where so much is not required and too
little where it is needed most. Smaller and weaker countries are su¤ering
most because they have neither the political clout nor the economic strength
to achieve their goals (Kirmani and Le Moigne, 1997). Negotiations on the
allocation of a water resource (or the benets from using it) are more di¢ cult
when one does not know in advance how much water supply or demand
will be generated under future conditions (e.g., population growth, economic
activities, climate change).
The last two decades have witnessed a growing public and scientic debate
about conict and cooperation, and development of adequate strategies and
institutions to manage international water. River basins are used for several
purposes and use in one country may have repercussions on possible uses
in the other basin countries. Due to externalities2, agreements formed by
grand coalition (basin-wide accords) are rare in river basins that consist of
more than three countries (Just and Netanyahu, 1998; 2000; Zawahri et al.
2010), and enforcement of cooperation particularly in international settings
is limited. In general, sharing a water resource will be formed and remain
stable only when economic incentives for each riparian party can be identied
(Just and Netanyahu, 1998).
Indeed, conicts between riparians of transboundary river basins are di¢ cult
to address because international water laws are not enforceable and grand
coalitional agreements are rare. Zawahri et al. (2010) showed that of the
1,084 treaties signed among sovereign countries between 1945 and 2007, only
195 are basin-wide accords and the rest are either bilateral or multilateral
agreements among part of the riparian states. They suggest that due to
the diversity of interests in multilateral settings, the focus of multilateral
treaties is expected to be on issues that involve joint gains from cooperation.
Moreover, if distributional problems result from the allocation of gains, then
2An externality is present whenever the activities of one country have direct, non-price-
mediated e¤ects on the activities of other countries.
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multilateral negotiation can e¤ectively address it through tradeo¤s and issue
linkages (Snidal 1991). Dombrowsky (2009; 2010) demonstrates, in a simple
bilateral context, how riparians may increase their shared benets from intra-
water sector issue linkage by linking of water uses with upstream-downstream
e¤ects in river basins in which riparians hold reciprocal positions. In addition
to intra-water sector issue linkage, one can also introduce non-water issue
linkages that could be even more attractive and exible.
Economic development which can involve treaty commitments to develop the
basin through construction of infrastructure, such as bridges, dams, barrages,
or irrigation networks, or even linking trade agreements is the most promis-
ing direction perceived by states to generate positive gains. Indeed, Wolf et
al. (1999), analyzing the content of 145 treaties, report that non-water issue
linkages do appear, where 30 percent are monetary linkages, 4 percent are
land linkages, 1 percent are political concessions, and 7 percent are other
linkages (58 percent of the treaties do not have issue linkages). In general, a
set of countries will form a coalition when each country realizes the poten-
tial gains. However, a grand coalition (a basin-wide agreement), including
all players is unlikely: some players may act independently or unilaterally
to maximize their own welfare and self-intersts. Hence, when negotiations
address an issue with strong asymmetry, combining (grouping) issues with
compensating asymmetry can be advantageous because countries are more
likely then to exchange in-kind side payments (compensations) and sustain
self-enforceable agreements that facilitate credible threats against defection
(Just and Netanyahu, 2000). Moreover, the partition of the water is just
one issue to be taken into account, and is insu¢ cient on its own to establish
a viable regime (sustainable development) which reects all water-related
problems in a transboundary water context.
This paper focuses on whether, and to what extent, games with externalities
can o¤er options for promoting sustainable development in transboundary
river basins through issue linkage. In this paper, unlike the case of inter-
connected games that are developed based on the noncooperative behavior
with more strategies (Ragland, 1995; Cesar and de Zeeuw, 1997; Kroez-Gil,
2003), we use games with externalities to investigate conditions under which
negotiating over di¤erent issues can reduce conict. We consider the coopera-
tive opportunities associated with dealing with di¤erent issues in comparison
with the cooperative opportunities of dealing with the linked issues.
The paper demonstrates that the outcomes of international negotiations de-
pend on the structures of the independent externality games. Using insights
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from game theory, the paper discusses the role/contribution of issue linkage
such as between water (e.g., Mekong River Commision) and non-water (e.g.,
Greater Mekong Subregion trading zone) and examines how linked games
can be used for promoting stable arrangements (agreements). An important
innovation of the linked games is that it can generate outcomes as scenarios
that cannot be obtained when issues are modelled independently without
side-payment. In the next section, some basic concepts and notations are in-
troduced. Section 3 introduces two special classes of games with externalities
and issue linkage. Section 4 demonstrates a river game with externalities and
analyzes several scenarios. Concluding remarks follow in the last section.
II. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be a nite set of players. A coalition S is a subset of
N . A partition P of N; a so-called coalition structure, is a set of disjointed
coalitions, P = fS1; :::; Smg, whose union is N . Let P(N) be the set of all
partitions of N .
The empty set ? is implicitly a member of each partition. For any coalition
S  N , P(S) denotes the set of all partitions of S. A generic element of P(S)
is denoted by PS;where for simplicity, we use P rather than PN .
For a given coalition S 2 P ; let NnS denote the coalition which is made up
of the outsiders to S. Moreover, for any subset S  N; let [S] denote the
typical partition which consists of the singletons of S, i.e. [S] = ffjgj j 2 Sg
and the coalition structure consisting of the grand coalition only by fNg:
For a partition P 2 P(N) and i 2 N; we denote the coaltion S in P to which
player i belongs to by S(j;P): Finally, let jSj be the number of players in S
and jPj the number of coalitions in P :
For a given P = fS1; S2; :::Skg such that jPj = k  n: A transfer function  :
P(N) ! P(N); a merger in the deviating subset of one coalition to another
in a given P, is dened as follows:
SSi(Sj;P) =
8<:
SinS
Sj [ S
Sl; if l 6= i; j
(1)
where Si; Sj 2 P and S  Si is deviated to merge with Sj forming a new
coalition.
The transfer function is just a move of players in a given coalition structure
P to form a new coalition structure P 0: Note that the number of coalitions
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in the orginal coalition structure P is larger than a new coalition structure
P 0; that is jPj  jP 0j; if and only if Sj 6= ?: If Sj = ? then a deviated group
forms a new coalition and jPj < jP 0j:
For example, a coalition structure Si(m;P)(Sj;P) is formed when player
Si(m;P) deviates merging to Sj 2 P as
Si(m;P)(Sj;P) =
8<:
Sinfmg
Sj [ fmg
Sl; for any l 6= i; j
Example 2.1 Let P = fS1; S2; S3; S4g; where S1 = f1; 2; 3; 4g, S2 = f5; 6g; S3 =
f7g; S4 = f8g: If player 2 deviates to merge with S2, then S1(2;P)(S2;P) =
f134; 256; 7; 8g: If both players 1 and 2 deviate to merger with S2, then
 f12gS1(S2;P) = f34; 1256; 7; 8g:
Partition Functions
A pair (S;P) consisting of a coalition S and a partition P to which S be-
longs is called an embedded coalition. Let E(N) denote the set of embedded
coalitions.
We denote by (N;w) a game in partition function form (or a partition
function form game) where w : E(N)  ! R is called a partition function that
assigns a real value, w(S;P), to each embedded coalition (S;P). For a given
coalition structure P ; the value w(S;P) represents the payo¤ of coalition S.
By convention, w(?;P) = 0 for all P.
The set of partition function form games (PFFGs) with player set N is
denoted by PGN .
Let w 2 PGN : w is superadditive if for S; T 2 P ;
w(S [ T ;Pn(S; T ) [ (S [ T ))  w(S;P) + w(T ;P): (2)
Note that for any characteristic function form games (CFGs), supperaditivity
implies the e¢ ciency of the grand coaltion. However, for PFFGs, superad-
ditivity is not enough to guarantee the e¢ ciency of the grand coalition. It
is easy to show that the grand coalition is always e¢ cient for any positive
externality games (dened in the next section).
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Example 2.2 Consider the following symmetric game with N = 1; 2; 3 and
w(fig; [N ]) = 5 for all i 2 N ; w(N ; fNg) = 14;
w(fig; ffig; fjkgg) = 2 and w(fj; kg; ffig; fjkgg) = 11 for fi; j; kg = N:
This game is superaditive, but the grand coalition is not e¢ cient asw(N ; fNg) =
14 <
P
i2N w(fig; [N ]) = 15 (possibly because of negative externalities).
Though the coalitions gain more by merging, others are worse o¤, the grand
coalition gets less than the total payo¤ in some other partition. For examples,
trading partners deciding upon custom unions, rms competing for market
shares and collaboration between di¤erent auctioneers with complementary
objectives.
Notation 2.1 For a given partition P = fS1; :::; Smg and w 2 PGN ,
let w(S1; :::; Sm) denote the m-vector (w(Si;P))mi=1: It will be convenient
to economize brackets and suppress the commas betwen elements of the
same coalition. Thus, we will write, for example, w(fijkg; ffijkg; flhgg)
as w(ijk; fijk; lhg); and w(fijk; lhg) as w(ijk; lh):
A strong assumption on the value function in CFGs is convexity. Convexity
games imply not only that the merging of two coaltions is benecial for them,
but also that merging with a larger coalition is more benecial (e.g., increas-
ing returns to cooperation). A natural extention of convexity to PFFGs can
be given as follows.
Let w 2 PGN : w is convex if for any Si; Sj  N such as jSij < jSjj; and
for any m 2 NnfSi; Sjg and P =fSi; Sj;PNnfSi;Sjgg;
w(Si[fmg; S(m;P)(Si;P)) w(Si;P)  w(Sj[fmg; S(m;P)(Sj;P)) w(Sj;P):
(3)
A solution concept on PGN is a function ' which associates with each game
(N;w) in PGN a vector '(N;w) of individual payo¤s in Rn; i.e: '(N;w) =
('i(N;w))i2N 2 Rn, where 'i(N;w) is the payo¤ to player i: A solution is
called e¢ cient if
P
i2N 'i(N;w) = w(N ; fNg) for all w 2 PGN :
Social welfare (for given P) is dened by SocW (P) =PS2P w(S;P):
For a given partition function form game (N;w), vW (N) = max P2P(N)SocW (P) =
maxP2P(N)
P
S2P w(S;P) is the e¢ cient outcome that players in N can
achieve via forming coalitions and working together to get the highest to-
tal payo¤ (social welfare).
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The core
The core is an important concept in cooperative game theory and has been
used for assessing the stability of arrangements that can be made within a so-
ciety in various contexts. In the case of externality, however, the predictions
given by the core may run into di¢ culties as some individuals or coalitions
benet depends not only on how benets are shared but also on which coali-
tions form. Therefore, one has to make assumptions about what a deviating
coalition conjectures about the reaction of the others while dening the core.
Since the core is not in general a singleton (i.e. has a single value), one can
have many denitions of core (further details, for example, see Hafalir, 2007;
Demange, 2009). In this paper, we focus on two particular core concepts
relating to the two extremes of behaviour of the agents 3. Two simple den-
itions of the core can be given by presuming that when coalition S is formed
then the agents outside will either play as singleton (Hafalir, 2007; Chander,
2010) or form a coalition (Markin, 2003; Chander, 2010).
Denition 2.1 A vector of payo¤s x = (x1; x2; :::; xn) is in the core with
singleton expectations, named the s-core, if for all S  N; we haveX
i2S
xi  w(S; fS; [NnS]g):
Note that the s-core denition assumes that the defecting coalitions are very
pessimistic in PFGs with positive externalities but very optimistic in the
case of PFGs with negative externalities. The s-core does not require xi 
w(i; fi; fNnig) (similar to the  core, see Chander, 2010).
Denition 2.2 A vector of payo¤s x = (x1; x2; :::; xn) is in the core with
merging expectations, named the m-core, if for all S  N; we haveX
i2S
xi  w(S; fS; fNnSgg):
III. GAMES WITH EXTERNALITIES AND ISSUE LINKAGE
Transboundary externalities occur when actions in one country a¤ect the
welfare of residents or the environment in another country. Externalities can
3Ambec and Ehlers (2008) consider two special behaviors of agents outside of coalition
S: either they play as a singleton (in non-cooperative core lower bounds) or as a coalition
against S (in cooperative core lower bounds).
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be classied into two categories: unidirectional and reciprocal (Dasgupta,
2002). Damage inicted by upstream pollution on downstream victims with-
out compensation is an example of the former, whereas the tragedy of the
commons(Hardin, 1968) is a metaphor for the latter. Groundwater with-
drawal under the riparian doctrine is an example of the tragedy of the com-
mons. For any given environmental objectives, society would like to achieve
e¢ cient and equitable outcomes. That is, maximize total welfare and then
share it among its members in an equitable way. In this section, we con-
struct a special class of games, the so-called game with externalities, where
the e¢ cient social welfare is not easily achieved due to externalities.
3.1 Game with externalities
Denition 3.1. Let w 2 PGN : w is called an externality game (EG) if for
S  N; w(S;P ) 6= w(S;PNnS [ S) for any PNnS 2 P (NnS):
Proposition 3.1 If an externality game is convex, then the s-core is non-
empty.
Proof. We observe that if w 2 PGN is convex, then for any l;m 2 N , l 6= m
, S  Nnfl;mg and any partition P =fS; l;m;PNnfS[fl;mggg;
w(S[fl;mg;  fl;mg(S;P)) w(S[l;  flg(S;P))  w(S[m;  fmg(S;P)) w(S;P)):
(4)
One can easily derive the condition above from the convex condition (3) in
Section 2 by letting Sj = S [ l; and Si = S: Then the proof of the proposi-
tion is straightforward from the previous condition (4) and Proposition 2 in
Hafalir (2007).
For a given w 2 PGN , w has positive (negative) externalities if for any
coalition S 2 P, and for any partition P 0 2 P(N) such that jPj > jP 0j
w(S;P)  w(S;P 0) (5)
(  )
In words, a game has positive (negative) externalities if a merger between two
coalitions makes other coalitions better (worse) o¤. In this paper, we focus on
two special classes of games with externalities, namely free riding (positive
externality) and trading (negative externality) games dened as follows.
(FRG) A positive externality game w is called a free riding game (FRG) if
(i) w(N ; fNg) PS2P w(S;P), 8 P 2 P(N) and
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(ii) There exists a coalition S  N such that for w(S;P) > w(S;P 0)
where jPj > jP 0j:
Condition (i) implies that the grand coalition is the most e¢ cient coalition,
while condition (ii) implies that a coalition S expects to benet from the
merger of coalitions by not joining the merger. When S = fig, player i is
called a free rider.
(NEG) An externality game w is called a trading game or a strict
negative externality game (NEG) if
(i) w(N ; fNg) PS2P w(S;P), 8 P 2 P(N) and
(ii) There exists a coalition S  N such that for w(S;P)  w(S;P 0)
where jPj > jP 0j:
For i 2 N; let P i be a coaltion structure where player i plays as a single-
ton. Let P i(N) = fP i= fi;PNnigg:
For a given w 2 PGN and P 2 P(N). Let w(fig) = minPi2Pi(N)fw(i;P
i)g
and w(fig) = max
Pi2Pi(N)
fw(i;P i)g for all i 2 N ;
andw(S) = minPNnS2P(NnS)
fw(S;PNnS)g andw(S) = maxPNnS2P(NnS)fw(S;PNnS)g
for all S 2 P :
The following proposition contains some basic relationships for a class of free
rider games (similar to the non-cooperative core lower bounds and coopera-
tive core lower bounds introduced by Ambec and Ehlers, 2008).
Proposition 3.2 Let w 2 PGN : If i is a free rider, then the following
conditions hold for any partition structure P i 2 P i(N)
w(fig) = w(i; [N ])  w(i;P i)  w(i; fi; fNn igg) = w(fig):
Proof. By properties of free rider games, merging between two coalitions
makes other coalitions better o¤, the proof of this Proposition is obvious and
is left to the reader (or see Ambec and Ehlers, 2008).
Issue linkage
In many economic environments, the payo¤ resulting from the formation of
the grand coalition may be ine¢ cient because the total surplus may not be
maximized. Due to increased transaction cost of managing larger groups,
some players (free riders) may be better o¤ by remaining separate when
others form a coalition. The main challenge of this paper is to look at so-
lutions that can be motivated by the principle of Territorial Integration of
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all Basin States (TIBS) in a broader sense that could satisfy both upstream
and downstream countries. The topic of issue linkage is not new. Issue
linkage has been studied in noncooperative games representing international
negotiations across countries and it has been argued that combining negotia-
tions over di¤erent dimensions (trade, protection of environment) may have
benecial e¤ects (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1994, Conconi and Perroni, 2002).
When negotiations address an issue with strong asymmetry, grouping issues
with opposite asymmetry can be advantageous because countries are more
likely to exchange in-kind side payments rather than monetary side payments
and facilitate credible threats against defections (Just and Netanyahu, 2000).
In their works, Bennett et al. (1997), Kliot et al (2001) and Kemfert (2004)
suggested that the complexity of international negotiations can be better
modeled by linking independent games.
The linkage principle argues for tying river sharing agreements (RSAs) to
other (not necessarily related) issues that are of concern and can benet one
or more countries. Examples of potential issue linkages include total water
allocation of shared water among countries and non-water environmental
degradation such as pollution of the common watershed and economics trade.
We selected two issues for the preliminary linked game in our analysis: a
river sharing problem and the trade in food products. These two issues may
produce results preferred to bargaining over the water alone.
We assume that negotiating countries can play noncooperatively in order
to determine (evaluate) their policy (variables)4. E¢ ciency for a group of
countries (a coalition), be it N or any subset S of it, is a joint policy of the
members of the group that maximizes the groups aggregate welfare. For
example, issue linkage5 is considered to provide cooperation opportunities
related to either water ow control or technological innovation or trade sanc-
tions against free riders. The coalition structures associated with the linked
game, therefore, are simply the coalition structures that have been considered
by all players in the bargaining process. Hereby their values are determined
by the sum of the partition functions that are associated with each issue
(taken separately)6. Formally,
4That means (depending on the outcomes) that players decide whether or not to act
cooperativelly (i.e. join a coalition and sign a agreement).
5For example, the rst issue of a linked game, "the water stage", is a river game
(Ambec and Ehlers, 2008) while the second issue is a trading game where a group of
countries anounces forming a coalition and members of the coalition expect the outsiders
to play non-cooperatively when they compute their highest outcomes (welfares).
6One can also consider the linked games as the 2-stage (or 3-stage) games where all play
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Let wi 2 PGN ; i = 1; 2; we construct a (2-) linked game as the sum of two
independent (directed) games7. The new game, denoted by w12;has its value
is determined by the sum of the two values of two independent games in the
same structures. Formally,
w12(S;P) = w1(S;P) + w2(S;P);8S 2 P 2 P(N):
Example 3.1 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and wi 2 GPN , i = 1; 2, dened as follows
w1(fig; [N ]) = 5 for all i 2 N ; w1(N ; fNg) = 14;
w1(fig; ffig; fjkgg) = 2
and w1(fj; kg; ffig; fjkgg) = 11 for fi; j; kg = N:
w2(fig; [N ]) = 4 for all i 2 N ; w2(N ; fNg) = 12;
w2(fig; ffig; fjkgg) = 6
and w2(fj; kg; ffig; fjkgg) = 6 for fi; j; kg = N:
Then w12(fig; [N ]) = 7 for all i 2 N ; w12(N ; fNg) = 26;
w12(fig; ffig; fjkgg) = 8
and w12(fj; kg; ffig; fjkgg) = 17 for fi; j; kg = N:
Remark 3.1. One can easily see that any linked game formed by two ex-
ternality games is associated with externalities. However, these externalities
may be positive or negative.
To explore in further detail the linkage argument, consider the following
example.
There are two countries, upstream and dowstream that share a river. The
countries have two options, to cooperative or to defect, and they do not
mix strategies for improving their welfare, based on two issues: water and
trading. Cooperate and defect refer to the countrys strategies for each game
(each issue). The payo¤s for each outcome of the game are represented by
Bijk (water issue) and V
i
jk (trade issue), with the superscipt representing the
player i = U;D (e.g., Upstream and Downstream countries).
Water game Trade game
Down Down
Up
Not Pay Pay
Not Share (BUdd; B
D
dd) (B
U
dc; B
D
dc)
Share (BUcd; B
D
cd) (B
U
cc; B
D
cc)
Up
Restrict Open
Restrict (V Udd; V
D
dd ) (V
U
dc ; V
D
dc)
Open (V Ucd; V
D
cd ) (V
U
cc; V
D
cc)
non-cooperatively at their rst stage and then forming coalitions at the second stage. The
nal outcomes as the results of linked issues can o¤er potential advantages for cooperation.
7It also holds and can be extended for n linked game, where n > 2:
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Without loss of generality, the rst letter j in the subscript identies the
strategy played by U (c = cooperate, d = defect) while the second letter k
played identies the strategy played by D.
Water issue: Assuming that each country has two strategies8: the upstream
country chooses between sharing (cooperate) or not sharing (defect) water
with the downstream. The dowstream country chooses whether it makes
a side payment (cooperate) or not (defect) to the upstream country. For
a transboundary river, static games may generate outcomes in which the
upstream country has a dominant strategy not to cooperate with the down-
stream country, namely, not share or clean up water. The essence of the
transboundary problems can be presented as a prisoner dilemma (PD) with
a payo¤ structure given by
BUdc > B
U
cc > B
U
dd > B
U
cd; and B
D
cd > B
D
cc > B
D
dd > B
D
dc: (C1)
The conditions above9 show that the upstream countrys dominant strategy
is to choose not to share, because sharing the water always costs it some
welfare reduction. The downstream countrys dominant strategy is not to
pay because making side payment always reduces its welfare. For this PD
outcome, the Nash equilibrium is not socially an optimal outcome. Both
countries could receive higher payo¤s if they could agree to cooperate.
In this issue, a partition function wW can be obtained as follows
(i) From Nash equilibrium (NE):
wW (i; [N ]) = Bidd and w
W (N ; fNg) = BUcc+BDcc:
(ii) From free rider (optimistic) behavior :
wW (i; [N ]) = maxBijk for any j 6= k and wW (N ; fNg) = BUcc+BDcc
The above implies that there are two options: either
BUdd+B
D
dd = w
W (U ; [N ]) + wW (D; [N ])  wW (N ; fNg) = BUcc+BDcc (6)
or
BUcc+B
D
cc = w
W (N ; fNg)  wW (U ; [N ]) + wW (D; [N ]) = BUdc+BDdc: (7)
8Defect and cooperate are terms that stem from the famous prisonersdilemma (PD).
The meaning here is that defect stands for the policy without share/release water, whereas
cooperate stands for the sharing policy.
9For simplicity, we can assume that BUdc > B
U
cc > B
U
dd = 0 > B
U
cd; and B
D
cd > B
D
cc >
BDdd = 0 > B
D
dc:
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Therefore, deriving from Nash equilibrium we obtain a positive externality
game (i), while the second case (ii) is an externality only (grand coalition is
less than the sum of free ridding values).
Trade issue: Assuming the countries choose between restricted (higher 
trade bariers) or openness policies. The payo¤ structure10of trading is as-
sumed to be
V Ucc > V
U
dc = 0 = V
U
dd > V
U
cd and V
D
cc > V
D
cd = 0 = V
D
dd > V
D
dc (C2)
In this game, there are two Nash equilibria: one corresponding to mutual
protectionism (or punishment) and the other to mutual openness only if
they can be assured that other nations will do likewise; open trade is only
benecial if reciprocated11.
The partition functions wT can be determined based on one of two NE12 as
follows
(i) For openness:
wT (i; [N ]) = maxV ijj and w
T (N ; fNg) = V Ucc+ V Dcc :
(ii) For protectionism:
wT (i; [N ]) = minV ijj and w
T (N ; fNg) = V Ucc+ V Dcc :
It is now assumed that these two issues are linked based on the countries
preferences. According to all possible outcomes, there exists 4 linked games
representing 4 options (scenarios)13 given as follows.
(L1) From Nash equibrium and protectionism:
wWT (i; [N ]) = Bidd+V
i
dd and w
WT (N ; fNg) = BUcc+V Ucc + UDcc+V Dcc
10The standard trade theory uses a cooperative trading game with the assumptions
V Ucc > V
U
cd > V
U
dc > V
U
dd and V
D
cc > V
D
dc > V
D
cd > V
D
dd ; which is one dominant strategy
to restrict trade barriers. Hence, there is no need for negotiations-that nations should
liberalize unilaterally (Krugman, 1997).
11This reality may reect the political di¢ culties of persuading the public that unilateral
trade liberalization is not tantamount to unilateral disarmament (Hauer and Runge, 1999).
12This is an assurance problems in which the equilibrium outcome may be either a
successful agreement to match concessions, or an unsuccessful one, in which nations fail
to expand the domain of non discrimination. In other words, while the outcome of trade
liberalization is not always achieved, it is achievable in principle, and is Pareto superior,
o¤ering net gains to both players.
13Note that individual rationality implies that countries could play Nash and protec-
tionism but consider conditions for getting better outcomes.
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(L2) From free ridding and and protectionism:
wWT (i; [N ]) = max
k 6=j
Bijk+V
i
dd and wWT (N ; fNg) = BUcc+V Ucc+UDcc+V Dcc
(L3) From Nash equilibrium and openness:
wWT (i; [N ]) = Bidd+V
i
cc and wWT (N ; fNg) = BUcc+V Ucc + UDcc+V Dcc
(L4) From free ridding and openness:
wWT (i; [N ]) = max
k 6=j
Bijk+V
i
cc and wWT (N ; fNg) = BUcc+V Ucc + UDcc+V Dcc
Observe that in options (L1) and (L3), wWT (N ; fNg) > wWT (i; [N ]) +
wWT (j; [N ]) because Bicc > B
i
dd and V
i
cc > V
i
dd: In these two cases, the grand
coalition is socially optimal and cooperation can be achieved. For the second
option (L2), the grand coalition is optimal i¤ maxk 6=j Bijk  U icc+V icc for
all i = U;D. (note that V idd = 0 for all i as conditions (C2)). For the
last option (L4), the grand coalition is not e¢ cient14 because maxk 6=j Bijk >
Bicc: However, regarding rationality, the two options (L1) and (L3) that are
determined by Nash equilibria are feasible/possible for the players. This
implies that linking two independent issues can lead to more opportunities
for cooperation.
IV. A RIVER GAME WITH EXTERNALITIES
This section investigates whether incentives exist for free rider countries (or
the situation resembles the PD) to join an existing transboundary resource
control cooperating coalition. In the following we consider a group of coun-
tries in the two regions of a river basin: upstream and downstream. In the
absence of agreement, each country chooses the policy that suits it best, given
policies it believes other countries selected. If marginal benets are higher for
players located more downstream (or upstream), then it may be protable
to form a coalition S to pass some water from one member (component) to
another member (component). We rst present the river sharing problem
introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), extended by Ambec and Ehlers
(2008) and Ambec and Dinar (2010). We then will study a combined par-
tition function form game (linked games) in which players negotiate a river
sharing agreement (RSA) based on water ows (with multiple objectives)
among countries.
14It can be e¢ cient if maxk 6=j Bijk = B
i
cc for all i.
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Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be the set of players along the river, numbered succes-
sively from upstream to downstream and ei  0 be the amount (inow) of
water on the territory of country i. Assume that the water ei owing into
the river from country i can only be consumed by the countries which are lo-
cated downstream from country i (as natural water ows)15. Moreover, every
country has its utility (benet) function bi(x), from diverting/controlling x
units of water ows, which is a strictly concave function.
A water allocation plan x = (xi)i2N (= (x1; x2; :::; xn)) assigns an amount of
water xi to every country i under restrictions
jX
i=1
xi 
jX
i=1
ei; j = 1; 2; ::n:
and to a coalition S  N restrictionsX
i2S
xi 
X
i2S
ei; S 2 P :
For every coalition S  N; denote by x(S) = Pi2S xi and e(S) = Pi2S ei
the sum of x = (xi)i2S and e = (ei)i2S; respectively.
We assume that each country has its own optimal (water) plan xi based on
the total water ows e(N) =
Pn
j=1 ej and it never consumes more than its
satiated point xspi (that is xi < x
sp
i ) for all i 2 N: Since the benet function
is strictly concave, the satiation point xspi exists and is unique (Ambec and
Ehlers, 2008). However, the existence of satiation points may cause serious
consequences such as positive/negative externalities on sharing water ows
(seasons or ability to take xsp(S) =
P
i2S x
sp
i  e(S)): Some countries can
form a coalition S to make them more protable so that they agree to re-
lease/pass more water to supply their downstream members or other reasons,
including having power to block water to downstream or modifying its sati-
ated point, which could cause available water to be reduced to downstream.
We also assume that when S is formed (for sharing water ows) the outsiders
of S acts non-cooperatively and consume at least their own water ow16. A
15It implies that each country can be assigned at most the water inow at the territories
of itself and its upstream countries, but the water inow downstream of some countries
cannot be allocated to this country.
16Other options can be extended and left for our future works.
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water allocation plan x 2 Rn is optimal if it maximizes the social welfare
maximization problem, that is
max
x2Rn
nX
i=1
bi(xi); s.t x(S)  e(S) for all S  N (8)
Note that given the water ows e, a countrys optimal water is determined
from a backwards induction algorithm (details, see Remarks 1 and 2 in
Ambec and Ehlers, 2008) and the value of each coalition S is dened as
the sum of benets of their members based on the available water ows
e(S)( sp(S) =Pi2S spi). However, the existence of the e¢ cient allocations
on sharing water for each coalition depends not only on their commitment
of releasing water among members but also on their rights over water ows.
Kilgour and Dinar (1995) have proposed several principles, concerning the
"water right" assigned to the di¤erent countries along the river, to prevent
or resolve disputes on water allocation within a transboundary water basin.
Indeed, both the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) and Territorial Inte-
gration of all Basin States (TIBS) principles depend on how property rights
over water are dened. In the absence of a binding international agreement
on water allocation, there are positive externalities (the ATS) and negative
externalities (the TIBS) for individuals and groups of countries. For exam-
ple, the existence of satiation points may cause (i) positive externalities for
transferring water from upstream to downstream when there is some country,
j , such that i < j < k does not want to joint a coalition S where i and k
are already members; (ii) negative externalities for the TIBS principle.
Let w(S;P) be the highest secured welfare17 that coalition S can secure by
signing its own RSA with water ows e.
A partition function w, obtained from the unique values by computing a back-
ward induction mechanism (for every coalition) is called a river game with
externalities if there is a coalition S 2 P such that w(S;P ) 6= w(S;P 0):
The following Proposition is obtained directly from Ambec and Ehlers (2008,
Proposition 1).
Proposition 4.1 Let P 2 P(N) and S 2 P : Then for every river game
17That is w(S; ) =
P
i2S bi(x

i (N)); where x

i (N) is the e¢ cient allocation of water
among members i 2 S, given that the countries outside S divert water up to their satiated
point (details, see Ambec and Ehlers, 2008).
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(i) w(S; fS; [NnS]g)  w(S;P)
(ii) For any S; T 2 P ; w(S;P) + w(T ;P)  w(S [ T ; fPn(S; T );S [ Tg)
Note that (i) also implies that w(S; fS; [NnS]g) = minP2P(N);S2P w(S;P)
and that (ii) implies that a coalition can achieve at least as much as the sum
of what its parts can; i.e. the partition function w is superadditive.
Corollary 4.1 For every river game with positive externalities, the grand
coalition is the only e¢ cient outcome (e.g., maximal social welfare).
Proof. Let w be a river game with positive externalities. By Proposition 4.1
(ii), w is superadditive. Moreover, for all P 2 P (N);PS2P w(S; fS; [NnS]g) P
S2P w(S;P)  w(N ; fNg):
This Corollary implies that the highest social welfare can be achieved only
at the basin-wide level.
Remark 4.1 As mentioned above, there are two aspects of achieving RSAs
based on controlled water ows and developing sustainability at a basin level.
In particular, every river game can include both negative and positive exter-
nalities due to lack of water property rights.
Remark 4.2 Note that the s-core is a nonempty set for every river game
with positive externalities. However, achieving an RSA is not easy because
the s-core does not satisfy the maximal outcome that the free riders have
expected.
We assume that locations of water ows play an important role in determin-
ing a value of coalitions in a river game only and that the countries could
reach an agreement at the same time that they are involved in a set of nego-
tiations on another issue such as trading or technological innovations. In this
situation, assuming that a group of countries, coalition S, restricts imports
from other groups (i.e. NnS), but all countries could base an agreement
on an exchange of concessions by linking the water issue with the trading
for getting better outcomes. It is furthermore assumed that the constituting
games are strategy and payo¤ independent. However, all coalition structures
values are determined based on the water ow constraints. In addition, each
country has the right to a specic share of water (depending on the water
ows) and welfare (from free trade) to form its coalitions.
Let wR be a river game and wT be a game with externalities (Section 3).
Note that we have not introduced any budget-balance constraint in a river
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game, i.e. transferring moneys, as of Ambec and Ehlers (2008) and Ambec
and Dinar (2010). In the following, we pay attention to the core as conditions
for designing fair RSAs.
Let wRT be the linked game dened as wRT (S;P) = wR(S;P) + wT (S;P)
for every S 2 P 2 P (N): From section 3, it follows thatPS2P wRT (S;P) 
wRT (N ; fNg) = wR(N ; fNg) + wT (N ; fNg): Moreover, if the linkage game
wRT is convex, there exists a payo¤ x = (xi)i2N such that for any coalition
S  N , X
i2S
xi  w(S; fS; [NnS]g):
Proposition 4.2 If a linked game is convex, the s-core is nonempty.
The proof of this proposition follows from Section 3 in this paper.
Example 4.1 Consider a river shared by three countries, N = f1; 2; 3g. Let
the ordering of upstream to downstream be 1; 2; 3. Assume that countries
may consider a plan of negotiations for improving their welfare in both water
uses and trading agricultural products. Assume furthermore that countries
2 and 3 have more potential for producing food while country 1 has power
of controlling water ows. Once water is released by country 1, then coun-
try 2 has power to control the water ow further downstream, but to a
lesser extent. This water game represents the situation in the Euphrates-
Tigris (Turkey, Syria and Iraq) during several conicting incidents in the
past (Kibaroglu and Unver, 2000; Kibaroglu 2002).
Cooperation in water use means that the members of a coalition can get a
transfer/release of new technology or innovation along with water releases. If
no cooperation over water takes place, country 1 keeps most of the water for
regional development in its territory and holds a large surplus behind dams.
Then, countries 2 and 3 get the remaining ow on an egalitarian basis, but
without coordination of the releases between country 1 and 2, which leads
to waste (ine¢ ciencies). Cooperation between country 1 and 2, and country
1 and 3 takes the form of the transfer of e¢ cient irrigation technologies,
mainly from the more developed country 1 to the others (for details, see
Dinar and Wolf, 1994) and coordination of water releases to prevent waste.
It is assumed that water released in country 1 for country 3 will not be
challenged or conscated by country 2. Cooperation between country 2 and
3 takes the form of agreed allocation with coordination of the ow released by
country 1. Basin-wide cooperation takes the form of exchange of technologies
and agreed releases to address each countrys needs.
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Cooperation over trade takes the form of opening the market for trade in the
various crops, or reducing tax on trade in certain crops18. Cooperation over
agricultural trade is also possible as the three countries specialize in di¤erent
crops and have di¤erent relative advantages in growing some crops due to
their climate and soil properties. In the following trade game, a country not
part of a regional agreement achieves a lower economic payo¤ or even faces
losses from taxes needed to enter the market of the cooperating countries.
Basin-wide cooperation (grand coalition) then takes the form of all types of
actions mentioned above (agreed allocations and coordinated release times,
and transfer of irrigation technologies), which reduce waste and culminates
in higher payo¤ to the grand coalition.
Let wR and wT be partition functions for water and trade games, respectively
and dened as follows.
wR(1; 2; 3) = (10; 3; 3);wR(12; 3) = (15; 3);wR(13; 2) = (12; 8)
wR(23; 1) = (7; 10);wR(fNg) = 20 and
wT (1; 2; 3) = (1; 2; 3);wT (12; 3) = (8; 3);wT (13; 2) = (10; 1)
wT (23; 1) = (15; 0);wT (fNg) = 15:
The 2- linked game wRT is constructed such that
wRT (1; 2; 3) = (11; 5; 6);wRT (12; 3) = (23; 6);
wRT (13; 2) = (22; 9);wRT (23; 1) = (22; 10);wRT (fNg) = 35:
From the linked game wRT one can easily see that there exists some potential
cooperation because the grand coalition can cover/transfer all loser and free
ridersvalues (35 > 10 + 9 + 6 = 25) while it is impossible in the case of the
water game (20 < 10 + 8 + 3 = 21) and it is not feasible in the trade game
(wT (fNg) = 15 = w(23; f23; 1g)): In addition, the structure f13; 2g is not
stable in the river game because of free riding (of player 2).
Notice that in this example, player 2 is a free rider in both the river and
linked games, while player 1 is a loser both in the trade and linked games.
However, the role of player 3 remains unchanged. By changing the outcomes
or the rule of games, one can introduce several scenarios such as a scenario
in which there is no free rider.19
18In a trade game, negative values imply a loss of market supply or high tax.
19For example, given all values in the two independent games (player 1 is more powerful
in water game only) but player 3 has more power on trading such as wT (13; 2) = (10; 3),
then there is no free rider in the linked game.
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Remark 4.3 If the grand coalition of a linked game wRT constructed by two
games with externalities does satisfy
P
S2P maxPNnS2P(NnS)w
RT (S;PNnS) 
wRT (N ; fNg) then the m-core is nonempty.
This remark follows the fact that for every positive externality game, the
free ridersvalue is maxPNnS2P(NnS)w
RT (S;PNnS). Moreover, Proposition 3.2
shows that a free rider valuemaxPNni2P(Nni)w
RT (i;PNni) = wRT (i; fi; fNnigg):
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper applies the notion of partition function forms to international
river games with externalities and investigates incentives for cooperation that
could be enhanced by issue linkage. We show that there exist incentives
for non-cooperating countries to join a coalition by inducing issue linkage
such as linking water control and trade (or technological innovation). A full
cooperation on water use control and other (issue) improvements benet all
countries in comparison with unilateral strategy.
In particular, we showed that if an externality game is convex, then the s-
core is nonempty. We also found that for every river game with positive
externalities, the grand coalition (basin-wide agreement) is the only e¢ cient
outcome (i.e. maximizes social welfare), and further, if a linked game is
convex, the s-core is nonempty. These three ndings allow us to move to the
objective of our paper and to show that whenever opportunities for linkages
exist, countries may indeed move towards cooperation.
This conclusion supports the IntegratedWater Resource Management (IWRM)
discipline that has been promoted by water managers, but faced opposition
from others (economists, international relations and political science schol-
ars) on the grounds that due to inter-linkages leading to negative externalities
among riparian states, it would not allow a cost-e¤ective basin-wide arrange-
ment due to high transaction costs and little basis for developing joint in-
terests (narrow, or empty cores). However, we were able to demonstrate in
our analysis that, especially for situations in which externalities exist, the
basin-wide arrangement is the best solution. It can be achieved by identify-
ing issue linkages and linking them into one optimal basin-wide agreement.
In a future paper, we plan on demonstrating how issue linkage can help miti-
gate the externalities, using a river basin model with application to a specic
basin.
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